Irony and Outrage

Notes

Prologue

1. Shane, S. (2009). Conservatives draw blood from Acorn. New York Times. September 15.

2. Glenn Beck: Obama is a racist. (2009). Associated Press. July 29. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/glenn-beck-obama-is-a-racist/.

3. Weinstein, J. (2014). Glenn Beck: “I think I played a role, unfortunately, in helping tear the country apart.” Daily Caller. January 21.

4. Schmidle, N. (2016). Glenn Beck tried out decency. New Yorker. November 14.

5. Berry, J. M., & Sobieraj, S. (2014). The outrage industry: Political opinion media and the new incivility. New York: Oxford University Press.

6. Hesse, J. (2013). Why does every “conservative Daily Show” fail? Vulture. December 2. http://www.vulture.com/2013/12/why-does-every-conservative-daily-show-fail.html.

7. Nevins, J. (2017). Why can’t rightwing comics break into US late-night TV? Guardian. September 27. https://www.theguardian.com/global/2017/sep/27/why-cant-rightwing-comics-break-into-us-late-night-tv.

8. Green, J. (2012). Why aren’t conservatives funny? Washington Monthly. September/October 2012. https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septoct-2012/why-arent-conservatives-funny/.

9. Bershad, J. (2011). Why conservative comedy doesn’t work and likely never will. Mediaite. December 21. https://www.mediaite.com/online/why-conservative-comedy-doesnt-work-and-likely-never-will/.

10. Morrison, O. (2015). Waiting for the conservative Jon Stewart. Atlantic. February 14. https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/02/why-theres-no-conservative-jon-stewart/385480/.

11. Brown, A. (2015). Why all the talk-radio stars are conservative. Forbes. July 13. https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2015/07/13/why-all-the-talk-radio-stars-are-conservative/#7a076ee52788.

12. Lowry, B. (2014). How conservatives dominate the TV/radio talk game. Variety. January 3. https://variety.com/2014/voices/columns/how-conservatives-dominate-tvradio-talk-game-1201022387/.

13. Romero, D. (2010). Air America goes down; Liberal talk radio a fail. LA Weekly. January 21. http://www.laweekly.com/news/air-america-goes-down-liberal-talk-radio-a-fail-2398422.

14. Mordock, J. (2017). Conservatives get canceled, liberals quit laughing: How Trump’s election killed comedy. Washington Times. December 24. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/24/conservatives-banished-comedy-industry/. Nevins, Why can’t rightwing comics break into US late-night TV?

15. Hesse, Why does every “conservative Daily Show” fail?

16. Colbert, S. (2006). Lecture at Institute of Politics, Kennedy School, Harvard University. December 1. http://iop.harvard.edu/forum/conversation-stephen-colbert.

Chapter 1

1. Kreps, D. (2018). Samantha Bee addresses Ivanka controversy, regrets “one bad word.” Rolling Stone. June 1. https://www.rollingstone.com/tv/news/samantha-bee-addresses-ivanka-controversy-regrets-one-bad-word-w520972 Glenn Beck: Obama is a racist. (2009). Associated Press. July 29. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/glenn-beck-obama-is-a-racist/.

3. Nelson, L. (2016). Glenn Beck regrets “freaking out about Barack Obama.” Vox.com. November 7. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/7/13556876/glenn-beck-obama-trump.

4. Hemmer, N. (2016). Messengers of the right: Conservative media and the transformation of American politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 221.

5. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 111.

6. Brock, D. (2005). The Republican noise machine: Right-wing media and how it corrupts democracy. New York: Three Rivers Press.

7. Minutaglio, B., & Davis, S. L. (2013). Dallas 1963. London: Hachette UK, 231.

8. Minutaglio & Davis, Dallas 1963, 74.

9. Cray, E. (1997). Chief justice: A biography of Earl Warren. New York: Simon and Schuster, 390.

10. Cray, Chief justice.

11. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 22.

12. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 22.

13. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 111.

14. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 29.

15. Hemmer, N. (2016). The birth of conservative media as we know it. New Republic. September 2. https://newrepublic.com/article/136390/birth-conservative-media-know.

16. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 110–111.

17. Minutaglio & Davis, Dallas 1963, 251.

19. Minutaglio & Davis, Dallas 1963, 303.

20. Stahl, J. (2016). Right moves: The conservative think tank in American political culture since 1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

21. Sykes, C. J. (2017). How the right lost its mind. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 49.

22. Felzenberg, A. S. (2017). A man and his presidents: The political odyssey of William F. Buckley Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press.

23. Felzenberg, A man and his presidents, 137.

24. Felzenberg, A man and his presidents, 137.

25. Sykes, How the right lost its mind, 41.

26. Jurem, L. R. (2015). Reagan and his favorite magazine. National Review. December 5. https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/12/paving-way-reagan/.

27. Continetti, Matthew (2016). The coming conservative dark age. Commentary. April 12. https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/coming-conservative-dark-age/.

28. Test, G. A. (1991). Satire: Spirit and art. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

29. Nesteroff, K. (2015). The comedians: Drunks, thieves, scoundrels, and the history of American Comedy. Grove/Atlantic.

30. Sweet, J. (1978). Editor’s introduction to Something wonderful right away. New York: Avon Books, xvii.

31. Taormina, L. (2017). Personal communication. July 27.

32. Interview with Carl Gottlieb, excerpted in documentary The Committee: A Secret History of American Comedy (in production). Dir. Sam Shaw and Jamie Wright.

33. Excerpt from The Committee’s Wide World of War (LP, 1973), in documentary The Committee.

34. Excerpt from The Committee’s Wide World of War, in documentary The Committee.

35. Nesteroff, The comedians, 160.

36. Nesteroff, The comedians, 160.

37. Robinson, P. M. (2010). The dance of the comedians: The people, the president, and the performance of political standup comedy in America. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 150.

38. Robinson, The dance of the comedians, 150.

39. Cited in Krassner, P. (2011). One hand jerking: Reports from an investigative journalist. New York: Seven Stories Press, 123.

40. Johnson, K. H. (2008). The funniest one in the room: The lives and legends of Del Close. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 133.

41. Myerson, A. (2018). Interview with author. February 2.

42. Quoted in Nesteroff, The comedians, 243.

43. Sweet, editor’s introduction to Something wonderful right away, xlii.

44. Personal correspondence with author, January 31, 2018.

45. Excerpted in documentary The Committee.

46. Greenberg, E. (2017). Interview with author. September 8.

47. Greenberg, E. (2017). Interview with author. September 8.

48. Kercher, S. E. (2010). Revel with a cause: Liberal satire in postwar America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 253.

49. Sweet, J. (ed.) (1978). Something wonderful right away. New York: Avon Books, 284–285.

50. Von Hoffman, N. (1988). We are the people our parents warned us against. New York: Ivan R. Dee, 133.

51. Nesteroff, The comedians, 160, 217.

52. Nesteroff, The comedians, 160, 219.

53. Personal correspondence with author, February 2, 2018.

54. Thomas, M. (2012). The Second City unscripted: Revolution and revelation at the world-famous comedy theater. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 140.

55. Nesteroff, The comedians, 160, 243.

56. Robinson, The dance of the comedians, 172.

57. Robinson, The dance of the comedians, 172.

58. Bianculli, D. (2009). Dangerously funny: The uncensored story of “The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour.” New York: Simon and Schuster, xi.

59. Robinson, The dance of the comedians, 173.

Chapter 2

1. Colbert, Stephen (2006). Interview with N. Rabin. A.V. Club. January 25. https://tv.avclub.com/stephen-colbert-1798208958.

2. Guthrie, M. (2015). TV ratings: Bill O’Reilly to finish year with top-rated cable news show. Hollywood Reporter. December 21. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/tv-ratings-bill-oreilly-finish-850467.

3. Today the FCC’s rules place no limit on the number of television stations that can be owned by a single entity, as long as “the station group collectively reaches no more than 39 percent of all U.S. TV households.” FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules. Federal Communications Commission, www.fcc.gov. Updated December 27, 2017. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-review-broadcast-ownership-rules. Accessed March 28, 2019.

4. McChesney, R. (1999). Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in dubious times. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 17.

5. Bagdikian, B. (2000). The media monopoly. 6th ed. Boston: Beacon Press.

6. Bagdikian, The media monopoly, 4.

7. McChesney, Rich media, poor democracy, 48.

8. Bagdikian, The media monopoly, xii.

9. Kovach, B., & Rosenstiel, T. (2014). The elements of journalism: What newspeople should know and the public should expect. New York: Three Rivers Press, 50.

10. McChesney, Rich media, poor democracy, 49.

11. ASNE Statement of Principles (1975) (2011). October 24. Website of Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology. http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3588.

12. Press widely criticized, but trusted more than other information sources: Views of the news media: 1985–2011 (2011). Pew Research Center. September 22. http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/22/press-widely-criticized-but-trusted-more-than-other-institutions/#long-term-views-of-the-press.

13. Kovach, The elements of journalism, 59.

14. McChesney, Rich media, poor democracy, 51.

15. Gans, H. J. (2004). Deciding what’s news: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 51.

16. Gans, Deciding what’s news, 27.

17. Downie, L., Jr., & Kaiser, R. G. (2002). The news about the news: American journalism in peril. New York: Knopf.

18. Downie & Kaiser, The news about the news, 10.

19. Downie & Kaiser, The news about the news, 11.

20. Kovach & Rosenstiel, The elements of journalism, 61.

21. McChesney, Rich media, poor democracy, 54.

22. Downie & Kaiser, The news about the news, 231.

23. Downie & Kaiser, The news about the news, 10.

24. Bennett, W. L. (2016). News: The politics of illusion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

25. Bennett, News, 46.

26. Bennett, News, 47.

27. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

28. Edelman, Constructing the political spectacle, 63.

29. Bennett, News, 23.

30. Bennett, News, 24.

31. Arceneaux, K., Johnson, M., & Murphy, C. (2012). Polarized political communication, oppositional media hostility, and selective exposure. Journal of Politics, 74(1), 174–186. Vallone, R. P., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1985). The hostile media phenomenon: Biased perception and perceptions of media bias in coverage of the Beirut massacre. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(3), 577–585. Tsfati, Y., & Cohen, J. (2005). Democratic consequences of hostile media perceptions. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 10(4), 28–51.

32. Political polarization, 1994–2017 (2017). Pew Research Center. October 20. http://www.people-press.org/interactives/political-polarization-1994%962017/.

33. Carmines, E. G., & Stimson, J. A. (1989). Issue evolution: Race and the transformation of American politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

34. Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., & Horowitz, J. M. (2006). Party polarization in American politics: Characteristics, causes, and consequences. Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 86.

35. Desilver, D. (2016). Turnout was high in the 2016 primary season, but just short of 2008 record. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/10/turnout-was-high-in-the-2016-primary-season-but-just-short-of-2008-record/.

36. Sides, J., Tausanovitch, C., Vavreck, L., & Warshaw, C. (2018). On the representativeness of primary electorates. British Journal of Political Science, 1–9.

37. Outside spending (n.d.). Open Secrets.org. Center for Responsive Politics. https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/.

38. Fiorina, M. (2017). Unstable majorities: Polarization, party sorting, and political stalemate. Stanford, CA: Hoover Press.

39. Converse, P. E. (2006). The nature of belief systems in mass publics (1964). Critical Review, 18(1–3), 1–74.

40. Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405–431.

41. History of cable (2018). California Cable and Telecommunications Association. https://www.calcable.org/learn/history-of-cable/.

42. Ismail, S. (2010). Transformative choices: A review of 70 years of FCC decisions. Federal Communication Commission. October. https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-302496A1.pdf.

43. Ismail, Transformative choices, 12.

44. The Cable Center (2014). The cable history timeline. http://www.cablecenter.org/images/files/pdf/CableHistory/CableTimelineFall2015.pdf.

45. The Hollywood Reporter Staff (2011). How I Love Lucy dominated ratings from its start. Hollywood Reporter. August 15. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/how-i-love-lucy-dominated-222960.

46. Nielsen (2017). Tops of 2017: Television and social media. December 18. http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2017/tops-of-2017-television-and-social-media.html?afflt=ntrt15340001&afflt_uid=rMOU3B5yhVA.rF_y0LAKyVVbVxK4bGZ9aF7YyLCTSblb&afflt_uid_2=AFFLT_ID_2.

47. Nielsen (2016). Nielsen estimates 118.4 million TV homes in the U.S. for the 2016–17 TV season. August 26. http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2016/nielsen-estimates-118-4-million-tv-homes-in-the-us%97for-the-2016-17-season.html.

48. Bolin, G. (2014). The death of the mass audience reconsidered: From mass communication to mass personalisation. In S. Eichner & E. Prommer (eds.), Fernsehen: Europäische Perspectiven, 159–172. Munich: UVK.

49. Turow, J. (2007). Breaking up America: Advertisers and the new media world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

50. Turow, Breaking up America.

51. Turow, Breaking up America.

52. Crank Yankers was on the air as the lead-in program, airing in the slot before The Daily Show with Jon Stewart from 2002 to 2007.

Chapter 3

1. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

2. Berry, J. M., & Sobieraj, S. (2013). The outrage industry: Political opinion media and the new incivility. New York: Oxford University Press.

3. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 67.

4. Jamieson, K. H., & Cappella, J. N. (2008). Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment. New York: Oxford University Press, 46.

5. Talkers Estimetrix: Most-listened-to radio talk show hosts in America (2019). Talkers. http://www.talkers.com/top-talk-audiences/.

6. Hemmer, N. (2016). Messengers of the right: Conservative media and the transformation of American politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 265.

7. Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber.

8. Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber.

9. Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber.

10. Sherman, G. (2014). The loudest voice in the room: How the brilliant, bombastic Roger Ailes built Fox News—and divided a country. New York: Random House.

11. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 136.

12. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room.

13. Jones, J. (2005). Entertaining politics: New political television and civic culture. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

14. Hall, J. (1993). CNBC chief and former GOP media strategist Roger Ailes is executive producer for Rush Limbaugh’s show. Los Angeles Times. October 18. http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-roger-ailes-rush-limbaugh-19931018-story.html.

15. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 151.

16. Hemmer, Messengers of the right, 265.

17. Hemmer, Messengers of the right.

18. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 176.

19. Moore, F. (1995). Trying to cure what Ailes you. Associated Press. August 6.

20. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 178.

21. Sella, M. (2001). The red-state network. New York Times Magazine. June 24. https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/24/magazine/the-red-state-network.html.

22. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 178.

23. Sella, The red-state network.

24. Sella, The red-state network.

25. Sella, The red-state network.

26. Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber, 49.

27. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 194.

28. Sherman, The loudest voice in the room, 194.

29. O’Reilly Talking Points: White privilege. (2014). The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News. September 13.

30. O’Reilly Talking Points: How to oppose the totalitarian left on college campuses. (2016). The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News. December 4.

31. O’Reilly Talking Points: The pro–illegal immigration movement. (2017). The O’Reilly Factor, Fox News. January 26.

32. Steel, E., & Schmidt, M. (2017). Bill O’Reilly is forced out at Fox News. New York Times. April 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/business/media/bill-oreilly-fox-news-allegations.html.

33. Fisher, M. (2017). The making of Sean Hannity: How a Long Island kid learned to channel red-state rage. Washington Post. October 10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-making-of-sean-hannity-how-a-long-island-kid-learned-to-channel-red-state-rage/2017/10/09/540cfc38-8821-11e7-961d-2f373b3977ee_story.html?noredirect=on&utm:term=.8b1572586f3.

34. Fisher, The making of Sean Hannity.

35. Fisher, The making of Sean Hannity.

36. Schmidt, S. (2018). Trump touts Hannity’s show on “Deep State crime families” led by Mueller, Comey and Clintons. Washington Post. April 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/04/12/trump-touts-hannitys-show-on-deep-state-crime-families-led-by-mueller-comey-and-clintons/?utm:term=.f98463910014.

37. Stelter, B. Beck leaving CNN for Fox News. New York Times. October 16. https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com//2008/10/16/beck-leaving-cnn-for-fox-news.

38. Gold, M. (2009). Fox News’ Glenn Beck strikes ratings gold by challenging Barack Obama. Los Angeles Times. March 6. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/06/entertainment/et-foxnews6.

39. Farley, R. (2011). Glenn Beck’s greatest hits (and misses). Politifact. June 30. http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2011/jun/30/glenn-becks-greatest-hits-and-misses/.

41. Gold, Fox News’ Glenn Beck strikes ratings gold by challenging Barack Obama.

42. Chasmar, J. (2016). Glenn Beck on leaving Fox News: I was told to stop talking about God. Washington Times. February 15. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/15/glenn-beck-on-leaving-fox-news-i-was-told-to-stop-/.

43. Beinart, P. (2017). Glenn Beck’s regrets. Atlantic. January/February. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/glenn-becks-regrets/508763/?utm:source=nl-atlantic-daily-120816.

44. Beinart, Glenn Beck’s regrets.

45. Tucker Carlson Tonight (2018). February 22.

46. Tucker Carlson Tonight (2018). January 3.

47. Ahmed, T. (2017). Fox News’ Tucker Carlson strikes again: “Feminism is insincere.” Newsweek. October 12. http://www.newsweek.com/fox-news-tucker-carlson-strikes-again-feminism-insincere-683017.

48. Coaston, J. (2018). Watch: Tucker Carlson rails against America’s demographic changes. Vox.com. March 21. https://www.vox.com/2018/3/21/17146866/tucker-carlson-demographics-immigration-fox-news.

49. Tucker Carlson Tonight. (2018). June 14.

50. Wang, A., Chiu, A., & Jan, T. (2018). Facing boycott, Laura Ingraham apologizes for taunting Parkland teen over college rejections. March 29. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/03/29/laura-ingraham-savaged-for-taunting-parkland-activist-over-college-rejections/?utm:term=.217a78e1c632.

51. Ingraham Angle (2018). March 28.

52. Sullivan, E. (2018). Laura Ingraham told LeBron James to shut up and dribble; He went to the hoop. NPR. February 19. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/19/587097707/laura-ingraham-told-lebron-james-to-shutup-and-dribble-he-went-to-the-hoop.

53. Wang, Chiu, & Jan, Facing boycott, Laura Ingraham apologizes for taunting Parkland teen over college rejections.

54. PunditFact checks in on the cable news channels. (2015). Politifact.com. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/jan/29/punditfact-checks-cable-news-channels/.

55. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 8.

56. Marans, D. (2016). Sean Hannity: “I’m not a journalist. I’m a talk show host.” Huffington Post. April 14. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sean-hannity-not-a-journalist_us_570fc4f3e4b0ffa5937e6cd2.

57. Farhi, P. (2017). Sean Hannity thinks viewers can tell the difference between news and opinion. Hold on a second. Washington Post. March 28. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/sean-hannity-thinks-viewers-can-tell-the-difference-between-news-and-opinion-hold-on-a-moment/2017/03/27/eb0c5870-1307-11e7-9e4f-09aa75d3ec57_story.html?utm:term=.9739b066fda9.

58. Mitchell, A., Gottfried, J., Barthel, M., & Sumida, N. (2018). Distinguishing between factual and opinion statements in the news. Pew Research Center. June 18. http://www.journalism.org/2018/06/18/distinguishing-between-factual-and-opinion-statements-in-the-news/.

59. Mitchell et al., Distinguishing between factual and opinion statements in the news. Pew Research Center. June 18. http://www.journalism.org/2018/06/18/distinguishing-between-factual-and-opinion-statements-in-the-news/.

60. Key indicators in media and news. (2014). Pew Research Center. March 26. http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/state-of-the-news-media-2014-key-indicators-in-media-and-news/.

61. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 8.

62. The show moved to advertiser-free HBO under the moniker Real Time in 2002, after ABC canceled the show in response to pressures from audiences’ boycotts of sponsors. On the September 17, 2001, episode of Politically Incorrect on ABC, Maher had made controversial comments following the 9/11 attacks that angered audiences. “We have been the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away. That’s cowardly,” Maher said. “Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say what you want about it, it’s not cowardly.”

63. Roy, J. (2015). Lizz Winstead, Daily Show creator, on women in comedy and the end of the Jon Stewart era. The Cut. August 6. https://www.thecut.com/2015/08/daily-show-creator-on-the-end-of-the-stewart-era.html.

64. Roy, Lizz Winstead, Daily Show creator, on women in comedy and the end of the Jon Stewart era.

65. Jones, Entertaining politics, 48.

66. Baym, G. (2010). From Cronkite to Colbert: The evolution of broadcast news. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

67. Baym, From Cronkite to Colbert, 121.

68. Hagan, J. (2012). “It Won’t Hurt You. It’s Vapor.” New York Magazine, April 6. http://nymag.com/news/features/bill-maher-2012-4/.

69. Jones, Entertaining politics.

70. Young, D. G. (2008). The Daily Show as the new journalism: In their own words. In J. Baumgartner & J. Morris (eds.), Laughing matters: Humor and American politics in the Media Age, 241–259. New York: Routledge, 252.

71. Young, D. G. (2008). The Daily Show as the new journalism, 253.

72. Nightline (2004). July 28.

73. Nightline (2004). July 28.

74. Newhouse School Forum with Jon Stewart (2004). C-Span. October 14.

75. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (2004). August 23. http://www.cc.com/video-clips/qsowxe/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-kerry-controversy. See Young, D. G. (2008). The Daily Show as the new journalism, 247–248.

76. Jones, Entertaining politics, 75.

77. “The Colbert Report” wins Emmy for Outstanding Variety Series (2013). Huffington Post. September 22. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/22/colbert-report-emmy-win-2013_n_3966008.html?ir=Entertainment.

78. Gross, T. (2012). Colbert: “Re-becoming” the nation we always were. Fresh Air. NPR. October 4. https://www.npr.org/2012/10/04/162304439/colbert-re-becoming-the-nation-we-always-were.

79. “The Colbert Report” wins Emmy for Outstanding Variety Series.

80. Weprin, A. (2015). Jon Stewart to serve as executive producer of Colbert’s Late Show. Politico. September 9. https://www.politico.com/media/story/2015/09/jon-stewart-to-serve-as-executive-producer-of-colberts-late-show-004106.

81. Stewart, Jon (2002). Interview. Larry King Live. March 22. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0203/22/lkl.00.html.

Chapter 4

1. Test, G. A. (1991). Satire: Spirit and art. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

2. Test, Satire, 5.

3. Caufield, R. (2008). The influence of “infoenterpropagainment”: Exploring the power of political satire as a distinct form of political humor. In J. C. Baumgartner & J. S. Morris (eds.), Laughing matters: Humor and American politics in the Media Age, 3–20. New York: Routledge, 10.

4. Bergson, H. (1911). Laughter: An essay on the meaning of the comic. London: Macmillan, 96.

5. Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. London: Hutchinson.

6. Koestler, The act of creation, 35.

7. Martin, R. A. (2007). Psychology of humor: An integrative approach. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Academic Press.

8. Schmidt, S. R. (2002). The humour effect: Differential processing and privileged retrieval. Memory, 10(2), 127–138.

Eisend, M. (2009). A meta-analysis of humor in advertising. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 37(2), 191–203.

Blanc, N., & Brigaud, E. (2014). Humor in print health advertisements: Enhanced attention, privileged recognition, and persuasiveness of preventive messages. Health Communication, 29(7), 669–677. Strick, M., Holland, R. W., Van Baaren, R., & Van Knippenberg, A. (2009). Humor in the eye tracker: Attention capture and distraction from context cues. Journal of General Psychology: Experimental, Psychological, and Comparative Psychology, 137(1), 37–48.

9. Kant, E. (1951). Critique of judgement (1790). Trans. J. H. Bernard. New York: Hafner.

10. Sweet, J. (ed.) (1978). Something wonderful right away. New York: Avon Books, xxxix.

11. Bergson, Laughter, 127.

12. Griffin, D. H. (1994). Satire: A critical reintroduction. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 36.

13. Simpson, P. (2003). On the discourse of satire: Towards a stylistic model of satirical humour. Vol. 2. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 52.

14. Colbert, Stephen (2005). Interview. Fresh Air. NPR. December 5.

15. Burgers, C., van Mulken, M., & Schellens, P. J. (2012). Type of evaluation and marking of irony: The role of perceived complexity and comprehension. Journal of Pragmatics, 44(3), 231–242.

16. Burgers, van Mulken, & Schellens, Type of evaluation and marking of irony.

17. Children do not comprehend irony. At least not until they are about ten years old (it’s a rather sophisticated form of communication, which I will discuss in the coming pages). Prior to your child’s tenth birthday, you’ll only find yourself frustrated, as I did when used the “Go ahead! Leave your dirty plates on the table for me to clear! I’m only here to do your bidding, after all” approach with my then five-year-old son. He looked at me for a second, paused, and said, “Thanks Mom,” before retreating to his toys again.

18. Meyer, J. C. (2000). Humor as a double-edged sword: Four functions of humor in communication. Communication Theory, 10(3), 310–331.

19. Howrigan, D. P., & MacDonald, K. B. (2008). Humor as a mental fitness indicator. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(4), doi: 147470490800600411.

20. Greenwald, A. G. (1990). What cognitive representations underlie social attitudes? Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 28(3), 254–260.

21. Schmidt, S. R. (2002). The humour effect: Differential processing and privileged retrieval. Memory, 10(2), 127–138. Eisend, A meta-analysis of humor in advertising. Blanc, N., & Brigaud, E. (2014). Humor in print health advertisements: Enhanced attention, privileged recognition, and persuasiveness of preventive messages. Health Communication, 29(7), 669–677.

22. Nabi, R. L., Moyer-Gusé, E., & Byrne, S. (2007). All joking aside: A serious investigation into the persuasive effect of funny social issue messages. Communication Monographs, 74(1), 29–54. doi: 10.1080/03637750701196896.

23. Young, D. G. (2008). The privileged role of the late-night joke: Exploring humor’s role in disrupting argument scrutiny. Media Psychology, 11(1), 119–142. doi: 10.1080/15213260701837073.

24. Coulson, S., & Kutas, M. (2001). Getting it: Human event-related brain response to jokes in good and poor comprehenders. Neuroscience Letters, 316, 71.

25. Coulson & Kutas, Getting it, 74.

26. Coulson, S., & Lovett, C. (2004). Handedness, hemispheric asymmetry, and joke comprehension. Cognitive Brain Research, 19, 277.

27. Chan, Y. C., Chou, T. L., Chen, H. C., & Liang, K. C. (2012). Segregating the comprehension and elaboration processing of verbal jokes: An fMRI study. NeuroImage, 61(4), 899–906, 904. doi: 2012.03.052.

28. Coulson, S., & Williams, R. F. (2005). Hemispheric asymmetries and joke comprehension. Neuropsychologia, 43, 128.

29. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2013). Social cognition: From brains to culture. Los Angeles: Sage.

30. Graesser, A., & Mandler, G. (1978). Limited processing capacity constrains the storage of unrelated sets of words and retrieval from natural categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 4, 86–100.

31. Or just try to have a coherent phone conversation while your kid is in the room with you.

32. Polk, J., Young, D. G., & Holbert, R. L. (2009). Humor complexity and political influence: An elaboration likelihood approach to the effects of humor type in the Daily Show with Jon Stewart. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 17(4), 202–219. doi: 10.1080/15456870903210055.

33. LaMarre, H. L., & Walther, W. (2013). Ability matters: Testing the differential effects of political news and late-night political comedy on cognitive responses and the role of ability in micro-level opinion formation. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 25(3), 303–322.

34. Boukes, M., Boomgaarden, H. G., Moorman, M., & de Vreese, C. H. (2015). At odds: Laughing and thinking? The appreciation, processing, and persuasiveness of political satire. Journal of Communication, 65(5), 721–744.

35. Bergen, B., & Binsted, K. (2003). The cognitive linguistics of scalar humor. Language, Culture, and Mind, 79–92.

Chapter 5

1. Comprehending the joke does not require that you comprehend it in the way the speaker intended you to. It’s possible to “make sense of a joke” on your own in a way that is inconsistent with the speaker’s intended meaning. More on this later.

2. Wu, Z. (2013). The laughter-eliciting mechanism of humor. English Linguistics Research, 2(1), 52–63.

3. Wu, The laughter-eliciting mechanism of humor, 57.

4. Berlyne, D. E. (1960). Conflict, arousal, and curiosity. New York: McGraw Hill. doi: 10.1037/11164–000. McGhee, P. E. (1976). Sex differences in children’s humor. Journal of Communication, 26(3), 176–189.

5. Dunbar, R. I. M., Launay, J., & Curry, O. (2016). The complexity of jokes is limited by cognitive constraints on mentalizing. Human Nature, 27(2), 130–140.

6. Dunbar, Launay, & Curry, The complexity of jokes is limited by cognitive constraints on mentalizing, 136.

7. Attardo, S. (2009). Salience of incongruities in humorous texts and their resolution. In E. Chrzanowska-Kluezewska & G. Szpila (eds.), In search of (non)sense. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholoars Publishing.

8. Attardo, Salience of incongruities in humorous texts and their resolution, 165–166.

9. Brownell, H. H., Potter, H. H., Bihrle, A. M., & Gardner, H. (1986). Inference deficits in right brain-damaged patients. Brain and Language, 27(2), 310–321. Dagge, M., & Hartje, W. (1985). Influence of contextual complexity on the processing of cartoons by patients with unilateral lesions. Cortex, 21(4), 607–616. Shammi, P., & Stuss, D. T. (1999). Humour appreciation: A role of the right frontal lobe. Brain, 122(4), 657–666.

10. Brownell et al., Inference deficits in right brain-damaged patients.

11. Giora, R., & Fein, O. (1999). Irony: Context and salience. Metaphor and Symbol, 14(4), 241–257.Giora, R., Fein, O., & Schwartz, T. (1998). Irony: Grade salience and indirect negation. Metaphor and Symbol, 13(2), 83–101.

12. Wang, A. T., Lee, S. S., Sigman, M., & Dapretto, M. (2006). Neural basis of irony comprehension in children with autism: The role of prosody and context. Brain, 129(4), 932–943. Wang, A. T., Lee, S. S., Sigman, M., & Dapretto, M. (2007). Reading affect in the face and voice: Neural correlates of interpreting communicative intent in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64(6), 698–708.

13. Wang et al., Reading affect in the face and voice, 698.

14. Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(1), 116.

15. The following is a sample of the items typically used to create the need for cognition measure, taken from Cacioppo and Petty’s original scale: I would prefer complex to simple problems. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought. The scale also includes items that are measured in reverse. If an individual strongly agreed with these items, it indicates a lower need for cognition: I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth about something. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. Thinking is not my idea of fun.

16. Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), 197.

17. Cacioppo et al., Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation, 197.

18. For a review, see Cacioppo et al., Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation, 197.

19. Zhang, Y. (1996). Responses to humorous advertising: The moderating effect of need for cognition. Journal of Advertising, 25(1), 15–32.

20. Mayer, J. M., Peev, P., & Kumar, P. (2016). Contingent effects of humor type and cognitive style on consumer attitudes. In Let’s get engaged! Crossing the threshold of marketing’s engagement era, 739–751. Springer International.

21. From Thorson, J. A., & Powell, F. C. (1993). Development and validation of a multidimensional sense of humor scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 49(1), 13–23.

22. Young, D. G., Bagozzi, B. E., Goldring, A., Poulsen, S., & Drouin, E. (2017). Psychology, political ideology, and humor appreciation: Why is satire so liberal? The psychology of popular media culture. doi: 10.1037/ppm0000157.

23. Ruch, W., & Hehl, F. J. (1993). Humour appreciation and needs: Evidence from questionnaire, self-, and peer-rating data. Personality and Individual Differences, 15(4), 433–445.

24. Ruch & Hehl, Humour appreciation and needs, 435.

25. Ruch & Hehl, Humour appreciation and needs, 434.

26. Ruch & Hehl, Humour appreciation and needs, 443.

27. Apter, M. J. (ed.) (2001). Motivational styles in everyday life: A guide to reversal theory. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Apter, M. J. (2007). Reversal theory: The dynamics of motivation, emotion and personality. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oneworld.

28. Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. R. (1976). A disposition theory of humor and mirth. In Humor and laughter: Theory, research, and application, 93–115.

29. Becker, A. B. (2014). Humiliate my enemies or mock my friends? Applying disposition theory of humor to the study of political parody appreciation and attitudes toward candidates. Human Communication Research, 40(2), 137–160.

30. Thomas, C. A., & Esses, V. M. (2004). Individual differences in reactions to sexist humor. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 7(1), 89–100.

31. Thomas & Esses, Individual differences in reactions to sexist humor, 89.

32. Zillmann & Cantor, A disposition theory of humor and mirth.

33. Zillmann, & Cantor, A disposition theory of humor and mirth, 93.

34. Blake, A. (2017). Trump’s continued, not-so-subtle suggestion of violence. Washington Post. July 28. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/28/president-trump-encourages-violence-yet-again-this-time-by-police/?utm:term=.db0318935904.

35. Manchester, J. (2017). Long Island police department responds to Trump: We don’t tolerate roughing up prisoners. The Hill. July 28. http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/344402-long-island-police-department-responds-to-trump-we-dont.

36. Giora & Fein, Irony. Giora, Fein, & Schwartz, Irony.

37. Giora & Fein, Irony.

38. Seignovert, R. (2016). De qui se moque-t-on. Paris: Opportun.

39. Richardson, B., & Beck, P. (2007). The flow of political information: Personal discussants, the media, and partisans. In R. Gunther, J. Montero, & H. Puhle (eds.), Democracy, intermediation, and voting on four continents, 183–207. New York: Oxford University Press.

40. Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche news: The politics of news choice. Oxford University Press on Demand.

41. Lear, Norman (2012). Interview. Chautauqua Institution. September 14.

42. Vidmar, N., & Rokeach, M. (1974). Archie Bunker’s bigotry: A study in selective perception and exposure. Journal of Communication, 24(1), 36–47.

43. Vidmar & Rokeach, Archie Bunker’s bigotry, 46.

44. LaMarre, H. L., Landreville, K. D., & Beam, M. A. (2009). The irony of satire. International Journal of Press/Politics, 14(2), 212–231. doi: 10.1177/1940161208330904.

45. (2016). Late Show host says he has finally found his post–Colbert Report voice. Fresh Air. NPR. November 2. https://www.npr.org/2016/11/02/500303201/late-show-host-stephen-colbert-says-hes-finally-found-his-post-report-voice.

46. Late Show host says he has finally found his post–Colbert Report voice.

Chapter 6

1. Fechner, G. (1876). Vorschule der Aesthetik. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Hartel.

2. Palmer, S. E., Schloss, K. B., & Sammartino, J. (2013). Visual aesthetics and human preference. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 82.

3. Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, Visual aesthetics and human preference, 82.

4. Zhang, Y. (1996). The effect of humor in advertising: An individual-difference perspective. Psychology & Marketing, 13(6),1–545.

5. Haugtvedt, C. P., Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1992). Need for cognition and advertising: Understanding the role of personality variables in consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1(3), 239–260.

6. Stokmans, M. J. (2003). How heterogeneity in cultural tastes is captured by psychological factors: A study of reading fiction. Poetics, 31(5–6), 423–439. Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1997). Cognitive and social consequences of the need for cognitive closure. European Review of Social Psychology, 8(1), 133–173.

7. Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049.

8. Kruglanski, A. W., Atash, M. N., De Grada, E., Mannetti, L., & Pierro, A. (2013). Need for Closure Scale (NFC). Measurement Instrument Database for the Social Sciences. www.midss.ie.

9. Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: Need for closure and the unfolding of group-centrism. Psychological Review, 113(1), 84.

10. Chirumbolo, A., Brizi, A., Mastandrea, S., & Mannetti, L. (2014). “Beauty is no quality in things themselves”: Epistemic motivation affects implicit preferences for art. PloS One, 9(10), e110323.

11. Ostrofsky, J., & Shobe, E. (2015). The relationship between need for cognitive closure and the appreciation, understanding, and viewing times of realistic and nonrealistic figurative paintings. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 33(1), 106–113.

12. Chamorro-Premuzic, T., Reimers, S., Hsu, A., & Ahmetoglu, G. (2009). Who art thou? Personality predictors of artistic preferences in a large UK sample: The importance of openness. British Journal of Psychology, 100(3), 501–516, 501.

13. Wiersema, D. V., Van Der Schalk, J., & van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Who’s afraid of red, yellow, and blue? Need for cognitive closure predicts aesthetic preferences. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 6(2), 168–174.

14. Wiersema, Van Der Schalk, & van Kleef, Who’s afraid of red, yellow, and blue, 169.

15. Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper & Row.

16. Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375. Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60(1), 307–337. Leone, L., & Chirumbolo, A. (2008). Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(3), 755–762. Sargent, M. J. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1485–1493. Stern, C., West, T. V., Jost, J. T., & Rule, N. O. (2012). The politics of Gaydar: Ideological differences in the use of gendered cues in categorizing sexual orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. December 31. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264481.

17. Sargent, Less thought, more punishment.

18. Sargent, Less thought, more punishment.

19. Stern et al., The politics of Gaydar.

20. Stern et al., The politics of Gaydar.

21. Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism. Nature Neuroscience, 10(10), 1246; Anderson, C. J., & Singer, M. M. (2008). The sensitive left and the impervious right: Multilevel models and the politics of inequality, ideology, and legitimacy in Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4–5), 564–599. Jost, Federico, & Napier, Political ideology. Kemmelmeier, M. (1997). Need for closure and political orientation among German university students. Journal of Social Psychology, 137(6), 787–789.

22. Chirumbolo, A. (2002). The relationship between need for cognitive closure and political orientation: The mediating role of authoritarianism. Personality and Individual Differences, 32(4), 603–610. Ksiazkiewicz, A., Ludeke, S., & Krueger, R. (2016). The role of cognitive style in the link between genes and political ideology. Political Psychology, 37(6), 761–776. Onraet, E., Van Hiel, A., Roets, A., & Cornelis, I. (2011). The closed mind: “Experience” and “cognition” aspects of openness to experience and need for closure as psychological bases for right-wing attitudes. European Journal of Personality, 25(3), 184–197.

23. Jost et al., Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

24. Jones, P. E., Brewer, P. R., Young, D. G., Lambe, J. L., & Hoffman, L. H. (2017). Explaining public opinion toward transgender people, rights, and candidates. Public Opinion Quarterly, 5.

25. Jones et al., Explaining public opinion toward transgender people, rights, and candidates, 5.

26. Jost et al., Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

27. Jost et al., Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

28. Malka, A., Lelkes, Y., & Holzer, N. (2017). Rethinking the rigidity of the right model: Three suboptimal methodological practices and their implications. In J. T. Crawford & L. Jussim (eds.), Frontiers of social psychology: Politics of social psychology, 116–135. New York: Psychology Press.

29. Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. Motivation and Emotion, 36(1), 55–64.

30. Kanai, R., Feilden, T., Firth, C., & Rees, G. (2011). Political orientations are correlated with brain structure in young adults. Current Biology, 21(8), 677–680.

31. Jost et al., Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

32. Jost & Amodio, Political ideology as motivated social cognition.

33. Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism. Nature Neuroscience, 10(10), 1246.

34. Kanai et al., Political orientations are correlated with brain structure in young adults.

35. Jost & Amodio, Political ideology as motivated social cognition, 61.

36. Jost et al., Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

37. Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., Brocke, B., Ullrich, J., Strobel, A., & Strobel, A. (2010). Same or different? Clarifying the relationship of need for cognition to personality and intelligence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(1), 82–96.

38. Hetherington, M., & Weiler, J. (2018). Prius or pickup? How the answers to four simple questions explain America’s great divide. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

39. Hetherington & Weiler, Prius or pickup, 14.

40. Schaller, M., & Duncan, L. A. (2007). The behavioral immune system: Its evolution and social psychological implications. In J. Forgas, M. G. Haselton, & W. von Hippel (eds.), Sydney symposium of social psychology. Evolution and the social mind: Evolutionary psychology and social cognition, 293–307. New York: Routledge. Schaller, M., & Park, J. H. (2011). The behavioral immune system (and why it matters). Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(2), 99–103.

41. Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., Scalora, M., Hatemi, P., & Hibbing, J. (2008). Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. Science, 321(5896), 1668.

42. Oxley et al., Political attitudes vary with physiological traits.

43. Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 714–725. Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D., Iyer, R., & Haidt, J. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, political conservatism, and voting. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(5), 537–544.

44. Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. R. (2008). Disgust. In M. Lewis & J. Haviland (eds.), Handbook of emotions, 3rd ed., 757–776. New York: Guilford Press.

45. Haidt, J., Rozin, P., McCauley, C., & Imada, S. (1997). Body, psyche, and culture: The relationship of disgust to morality. Psychology and Developing Societies, 9, 107–131.

46. Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D., Iyer, R., & Haidt, J. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, political conservatism, and voting. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(5), 537–544.

47. Navarrete, C. D., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2006). Disease avoidance and ethnocentrism: The effects of disease vulnerability and disgust sensitivity on intergroup attitudes. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27, 270–282.

48. Terrizzi, J. A., Jr., Shook, N. J., & Ventis, W. L. (2010). Disgust: A predictor of social conservatism and prejudicial attitudes toward homosexuals. Personality and individual differences, 49(6), 590.

49. Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, Disgust, 590.

50. Aarøe, L., Petersen, M. B., & Arceneaux, K. (2017). The behavioral immune system shapes political intuitions: Why and how individual differences in disgust sensitivity underlie opposition to immigration. American Political Science Review, 111(2), 277–294.

51. Aarøe, Petersen, & Arceneaux, The behavioral immune system shapes political intuitions, 285.

52. Aarøe, Petersen, & Arceneaux, The behavioral immune system shapes political intuitions, 285.

53. Napier, J. L., Huang, J., Vonasch, A. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2018). Superheroes for change: Physical safety promotes socially (but not economically) progressive attitudes among conservatives. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(2), 187–195.

54. Napier et al., Superheroes for change.

55. See Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Lay epistemic theory in social-cognitive psychology. Psychological Inquiry, 1(3), 181–197.

56. Alford, J. R., Funk, C. L., & Hibbing, J. R. (2005). Are political orientations genetically transmitted? American Political Science Review, 99(2), 153–167.

57. Ksiazkiewicz, Ludeke, & Krueger, The role of cognitive style in the link between genes and political ideology.

58. Ksiazkiewicz, Ludeke, & Krueger, The role of cognitive style in the link between genes and political ideology, 767.

59. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, Are political orientations genetically transmitted?

60. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, Are political orientations genetically transmitted?, 165.

61. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, Are political orientations genetically transmitted?, 163.

62. Smith, K. B., Oxley, D. R., Hibbing, M. V., Alford, J. R., & Hibbing, J. R. (2011). Linking genetics and political attitudes: Reconceptualizing political ideology. Political Psychology, 32(3), 369–397.

63. Smith et al., Linking genetics and political attitudes.

64. Smith et al., Linking genetics and political attitudes.

65. Kruglanski, A. W., & Mayseless, O. (1988). Contextual effects in hypothesis testing: The role of competing alternatives and epistemic motivations. Social Cognition, 6(1), 1–20. Ford, T. E., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1995). Effects of epistemic motivations on the use of accessible constructs in social judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(9), 950–962.

66. Ford & Kruglanski, Effects of epistemic motivations on the use of accessible constructs in social judgment, 953.

67. Ford & Kruglanski, Effects of epistemic motivations on the use of accessible constructs in social judgment, 959.

68. The worst part about this tendency: I am a bad judge of character. The people who I am most drawn to at first glance are often hucksters. And the people I’m sort of suspicious of at first, often end up becoming some of my closest friends over time.

69. Webster & Kruglanski, Cognitive and social consequences of the need for cognitive closure.

70. Dwyer, M. M., & Peters, C. K. (2004). The benefits of study abroad. Transitions Abroad, 37(5), 56–58.

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71. Roche, M. W. (2010). Why choose the liberal arts? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Chapter 7

1. Interview with George Schlatter (2017). WTF with Mark Maron. September 21. Episode 848. http://www.wtfpod.com/podcast/episode-848-george-schlatter.

2. Wilson, G. D., Ausman, J., & Mathews, T. R. (1973). Conservatism and art preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25(2), 286.

3. Feist, G. J., & Brady, T. R. (2004). Openness to experience, non-conformity, and the preference for abstract art. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 22(1), 77–89.

4. Feist & Brady, Openness to experience, non-conformity, and the preference for abstract art, 77.

5. Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. (2013). Predisposed: Liberals, conservatives, and the biology of political differences. New York: Routledge.

6. Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, Predisposed.

7. Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, Predisposed, 94.

8. Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, Predisposed.

9. Smith, K. (2018). Vexation in Annihilation. National Review. February 25. https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/annihilation-film-review-science-fiction-puzzler/.

10. Smith, Vexation in Annihilation.

11. Smith, Vexation in Annihilation.

12. Romain, L. (2018). The “Shimmer” and ending of Annihilation explained. Nerdist. February 26. https://nerdist.com/annihilation-shimmer-ending-explained/.

13. Van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (2004). Openness to experience and boundaries in the mind: Relationships with cultural and economic conservative beliefs. Journal of Personality, 72(4), 659–686.

14. Hartmann, E. (1991). Boundaries in the mind: A new psychology of personality differences. New York: Basic Books.

15. Hartmann, Boundaries in the mind. As cited in Van Hiel & Mervielde, Openness to experience and boundaries in the mind.

16. Van Hiel & Mervielde, Openness to experience and boundaries in the mind.

17. Van Hiel & Mervielde, Openness to experience and boundaries in the mind, 660.

18. Van Hiel & Mervielde, Openness to experience and boundaries in the mind.

19. Ruch, W., & Hehl, F. J. (1993). Humour appreciation and needs: Evidence from questionnaire, self-, and peer-rating data. Personality and Individual Differences, 15(4), 433–445.

20. Forabosco, G., & Ruch, W. (1994). Sensation seeking, social attitudes and humor appreciation in Italy. Personality and Individual Differences, 16(4), 515–528.

21. Leggitt, J. S., & Gibbs, R. W. (2000). Emotional reactions to verbal irony. Discourse Processes, 29(1), 1–24, 5.

22. In the years after I conducted these experiments, Louis C.K. admitted to acts of sexual harassment—especially of younger female comics. This book doesn’t deal with that, but it’s difficult to talk about someone like Louis C.K. and not at least acknowledge that fact.

23. Bergson, H. (1911). Laughter: An essay on the meaning of the comic. New York: Macmillan, 127.

24. LaMarre, H. L., Landreville, K. D., & Beam, M. A. (2009). The irony of satire. International Journal of Press/Politics, 14(2), 212–231. doi: 10.1177/1940161208330904.

25. Vidmar, N., & Rokeach, M. (1974). Archie Bunker’s bigotry: A study in selective perception and exposure. Journal of Communication, 24(1), 36–47.

26. Farley, C. (2005). Dave speaks. Time. May 14. http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1061512,00.html.

27. Brown, K., & Youmans, W. L. (2012). Intermedia framing and intercultural communication: How other media affect American antipathy toward Al Jazeera English. Journal of Intercultural Communication Research, 41(2), 178.

28. Farley, Dave speaks.

29. Thorson, J. A., & Powell, F. C. (1993). Development and validation of a multidimensional sense of humor scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 49(1), 13–23.

30. Howrigan, D. P., & MacDonald, K. B. (2008). Humor as a mental fitness indicator. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(4). doi: 147470490800600411.

31. Raven, J. (2003). Raven Progressive Matrices. In R. S. McCallum (ed.), Handbook of nonverbal assessment. Boston: Springer.

32. Misch, D. (2017). Interview with author. October 10.

33. Howrigan & MacDonald, Humor as a mental fitness indicator.

34. Dagnes, A. (2012). A conservative walks into a bar: The politics of political humor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 133

35. Dagnes, A conservative walks into a bar, 148.

36. Dagnes, A conservative walks into a bar, 147.

37. Misch, D. (2017). Interview with author. October 10.

38. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

39. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

40. Bruce, L. (1992). How to talk dirty and influence people. New York: Simon and Schuster.

41. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

42. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

43. Spolin, V. (1999). Improvisation for the theater: A handbook of teaching and directing techniques. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, liii.

44. Spolin, Improvisation for the theater, 8.

45. Spolin, Improvisation for the theater, liii.

46. Spolin, Improvisation for the theater. Italics in original.

47. Greengross, G., & Miller, G. F. (2009). The Big Five personality traits of professional comedians compared to amateur comedians, comedy writers, and college students. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(2), 79–83.

48. Wagner, A. (2016). Does Trump know how to laugh? Atlantic. September 28. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/does-trump-know-how-to-laugh/501875/.

49. Thrush, G. (2016). What Chuck Todd gets about Trump. Politico’s off message podcast. December 30. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/chuck-todd-donald-trump-off-message-podcast-233066.

50. Wagner, A. (2016). Does Trump know how to laugh?

51. Libit, D. (2016). The inside story of Donald Trump’s Comedy Central roast is everything you thought it would be. Huffington Post. October 11. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-inside-story-of-donald-trumps-comedy-central-roast-is-everything-you-thought-it-would-be_us_57fbed42e4b0e655eab6c191.

52. Libit, The inside story of Donald Trump’s Comedy Central roast is everything you thought it would be.

53. Nave, N. N., Shifman, L., & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. (2018). Talking it personally: Features of successful political posts on Facebook. Social Media and Society, July–September, 1–12. doi: 10.1177/2056305118784771.

54. Nave, Shifman, & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Talking it personally, 8.

Chapter 8

1. Berry, J. M., & Sobieraj, S. (2014). The outrage industry: Political opinion media and the new incivility. New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 8.

3. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 47.

4. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 47.

5. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 133.

6. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 138.

7. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 44.

8. Notably, one of the few content categories in which conservative outrage did not “outrank” liberal outrage was in their use of “mockery or sarcasm,” where liberal and conservative shows scored about the same.

9. Joyella, M. (2018). MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow hits no. 1 with long, complicated segments viewers love. Forbes. December 31.

10. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 8.

11. Mutz, D. C. (2015). In-your-face politics: The consequences of uncivil media. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 148.

12. Hetherington, M. J., & Weiler, J. D. (2009). Authoritarianism and polarization in American politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 99.

14. Pew’s 2014 American Trends Panel is a national, probability-based online panel of adults in the United States living in households. Adults who use the internet participate in the panel via self-administered Web surveys, and adults who do not use the internet participate via computer-assisted telephone interviewing or mail. The survey was administered March 19–April 29, 2014. Respondents were shown a series of programming logos in a grid format and were asked: “Please click on all of the sources that you have heard of, regardless of whether you use them or not. If you are unsure, please DO NOT click it. You can click anywhere in each of the boxes.” Of those sources that the respondents indicated having heard of, they were then asked: “Please click on all of the sources that you got news from about government and politics in the past week. This includes any way that you can get the source. If you are unsure, please DO NOT click it.” The responses to this item resulted in the weighted Ns reflected in figures 8.1 and 8.2. The measures of party identification and ideology were based on the standard self-report.

15. O’Connell, M. (2013). TV ratings: MSNBC falls below HLN in May, Rachel Maddow hits lows. Hollywood Reporter. May 29. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/tv-ratings-msnbc-falls-below-559923.

16. “The Daily Show” and “The Colbert Report” finish 1Q 2013 as #1 and #2 among adults 18–49 and all key young demos. (2013). Futon Critic. April 4. http://www.thefutoncritic.com/ratings/2013/04/04/the-daily-show-and-the-colbert-report-finish-1q-2013-as-number-1-and-number-2-among-adults-18-49-and-all-key-young-demos-795303/20130404comedycentral01/.

17. The 2010 Media Consumption Survey, sponsored by the Pew Research Center, obtained telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of 3,006 adults living in the continental United States. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research, Associates International. The interviews were conducted in English by Princeton Data Source, June 8–28, 2010. Viewing estimates were obtained by asking respondents: “Now I’d like to ask you about some television and radio programs. How often do you … [Watch/listen to X], regularly, sometimes, hardly ever or never?” Ideology was asked with: “In general, would you describe your political views as … Very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?” Party identification was obtained with: “In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?” Percentages are based on weighted sample statistics.

18. March 2018 University of Delaware Poll conducted by the University of Delaware’s Center for Political Communication in collaboration with RABA Research (N = 608), March 21–22, 2018. In certain analyses, due to missing values and listwise deletion, the sample size drops to 601.

19. O’Connell, M. (2018). Maddow tops cable news demo ratings in January, but Fox retains overall wins. Hollywood Reporter. January 30. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/cable-news-ratings-msnbcs-maddow-leads-but-fox-news-is-still-top-1080124.

20. The 2015 data are based on a national online sample obtained by Qualtrics panels in March 2015, designed to acquire 45 percent conservative, 45 percent liberal, and 10 percent moderate respondents to facilitate comparisons between subgroups (N = 305). The 2018 data are from the University of Delaware Poll conducted by the University of Delaware’s Center for Political Communication in collaboration with RABA Research (N = 608), March 21–22, 2018. In certain analyses, due to missing values and listwise deletion, the sample size drops to 601.

21. The tolerance for ambiguity measure is based on a measure from Kruglanski, A. W., Peri, N., & Zakai, D. (1991). Interactive effects of need for closure and initial confidence on social information seeking. Social Cognition, 9(2), 127–148. Tolerance for ambiguity was measured with four items in 2015, coded from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5): I don’t like situations that are uncertain; I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways; When a book or film ends and it’s not clear what happens to the characters, I feel upset; It’s frustrating to listen to someone who cannot make up his or her mind. Alpha = .60, M = 2.45, SD = .71. Measured with three items in 2018, coded from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5): I don’t like situations that are uncertain; It’s frustrating to listen to someone who cannot make up his or her mind; When faced with a problem, I usually see the one best solution very quickly. Alpha = .49, M = 2.48, SD = .65. Correlations were run between “Tolerance for Ambiguity” and self-reported viewing of various programs. Results for 2015: Daily Show with Jon Stewart (r = .21, p < .001), Colbert Report (r = .24, p < .001), Oliver (r = .15, p < .01), O’Reilly (r = –.04, p < = n.s.), Limbaugh (r = .1, p = n.s.).

22. Results for 2018: The Daily Show with Trevor Noah (r = .09, p < .04), The Late Show with Stephen Colbert (r = .09, p < .03), The Rachel Maddow Show (r = .08, p < .05), Hannity (r = –.09, p < .04), The Rush Limbaugh Show (r = –.05, p = n.s.). The Late Show with Stephen Colbert (r = .1, p < .01), The Rachel Maddow Show (r = .1, p < .02), Hannity (r = –.06, p = n.s.), The Rush Limbaugh Show (r = –.05, p = n.s.).

23. In the model predicting exposure to Colbert (B for Tolerance for Ambiguity = .30, SE = .1, p < .004). In the model predicting exposure to The Daily Show (B for Tolerance for Ambiguity = .23, SE = .11, p < .03).

24. In OLS Regression predicting exposure to The O’Reilly Factor in the face of sociodemographic and political controls (Sense of Humor B = –.28, SE = .11, p < .01); predicting exposure to Rush Limbaugh (Sense of Humor B = –.24, SE = .11, p < .02).

25. While not perfect, a statistical test called mediation analysis can help researchers understand if the correlation between psychological traits and viewing preferences is enacted or articulated through political ideology. To test whether the correlation between tolerance for ambiguity and viewing preferences was partially explained by ideology, Hayes (2018) PROCESS macro was used. Hayes, A. F. (2018). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach. 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press. The macro allows researchers to test whether the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable are partially explained by some other factor (m). Based on a 95 percent confidence interval, the models were consistent with a mechanism in which the effects of the psychological trait (tolerance for ambiguity) on consumption of satire and outrage programming were significantly mediated by political ideology, as indicated by the fact that these confidence intervals did not include zero. The results of running these tests on data from both 2015 and 2018 show that the relationship of tolerance for ambiguity with exposure to satire and outrage was significantly mediated by political ideology.

26. I explored these propositions using the data from the University of Delaware Poll conducted by the University of Delaware’s Center for Political Communication in collaboration with RABA Research (N = 608), March 21–22, 2018. Included in the models predicting each program (The Daily Show with Trevor Noah, The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, The Rachel Maddow Show, Hannity, and The Rush Limbaugh Show) was an interaction of tolerance for ambiguity and political ideology. The tolerance for ambiguity X ideology interaction was statistically significant in three of the five models, predicting exposure to The Daily Show, Hannity, and The Rush Limbaugh Show. Regression models included the following as predictors: tolerance for ambiguity, need for cognition, party, ideology, political interest, following politics, age, education, race, and gender. Predicting exposure to The Daily Show, adjusted R². = .24. N = 601 (drop in N due to listwise deletion). Standardized Beta for the interaction of ideology X tolerance for ambiguity = –.37, p < .01. Predicting exposure to Hannity, adjusted R². = .28. N = 601 (drop in N due to listwise deletion). Standardized Beta for interaction = –.52, p < .001. Predicting exposure to The Rush Limbaugh Show, adjusted R². = .24. N = 601 (drop in N due to listwise deletion). Standardized Beta for interaction = –.37, p < .05. In all three cases, visual interpretations illustrate the very mechanism I’ve outlined throughout this section: that tolerance for ambiguity drives liberals to satire and a lack of such tolerance drives conservatives to outrage. Note that in certain analyses, due to missing values and listwise deletion, the sample size drops to 601.

27. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 229.

28. Delli Carpini, M. X., & Williams, B. A. (2001). Let us infotain you: Politics in the new media age. In W. L. Bennett & R. M. Entman (eds.), Mediated politics: Communication in the future of democracy, 160–181. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

29. Delli Carpini & Williams, Let us infotain you, 163.

30. Sobieraj, S. (2017). In-person interview with author. November 22.

31. Darcy, O. (2016). Fox News host Tucker Carlson’s on-air war with elitism. Business Insider. December 5. http://www.businessinsider.com/tucker-carlson-tonight-show-fox-news-2016%9612.

32. Song, J. (2015). John Oliver, a “disruptive comedian.” CBSNews.com. October 30. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/last-week-tonight-john-oliver-effect-american-politics-donald-trump/.

33. Griggs, B. (2015) Jon Stewart, in his own words. CNN. August 20. https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/05/entertainment/jon-stewart-wit-wisdom-feat/index.html.

34. Gay, V. (2004). Not necessarily the news; Meet the players who will influence coverage of the 2004 campaign; You might be surprised. Newsday. January 14. B6.

35. Sullivan, M. (2016). Samantha Bee says her show isn’t influential. Don’t believe her. Washington Post. July 27. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/samantha-bee-to-discontented-americans-canada-is-full/2016/07/27/25b7593a-5372-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm:term=.9801cd418d72.

36. John Oliver finds humor in the news no one wants to hear about. (2018). Fresh Air. NPR. March 7. https://www.npr.org/programs/fresh-air/2018/03/07/591487621/fresh-air-for-march-7-2018-john-oliver.

37. John Oliver finds humor in the news no one wants to hear about.

38. John Oliver finds humor in the news no one wants to hear about.

39. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

40. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

41. Baym, G. (2017). Journalism and the hybrid condition: Long-form television drama at the intersections of news and narrative. Journalism, 18(1), 12.

42. D’Addario, D. (2018). Shep Smith has the hardest job on Fox News. Time. March 15. http://time.com/longform/shepard-smith-fox-news/.

43. Sobieraj, S. (2017). Interview with author. November 22.

44. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

45. Black, A. (2018). Interview with author. January 5.

46. Griggs, Jon Stewart, in his own words.

47. Bloom, E. A., & Bloom, L. D. (1979). Satire’s persuasive voice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 38.

48. Sullivan, E. (2018). Laura Ingraham told LeBron James to shut up and dribble; He went to the hoop. NPR. February 19. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/19/587097707/laura-ingraham-told-lebron-james-to-shutup-and-dribble-he-went-to-the-hoop.

49. Greenwood, M. (2018). RBC Predicts low ratings for Oscars: “Americans aren’t interested in Hollywood liberals.” The Hill. February 28. http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/376178-rnc-predicts-low-ratings-for-oscars-americans-arent-interested.

50. For reasons that one could probably link to the underlying psychology of liberals and conservatives discussed throughout this book.

51. University of Delaware Poll conducted by the University of Delaware’s Center for Political Communication in collaboration with RABA Research (N = 608), March 21–22, 2018.

52. “Tolerance for ambiguity” items included: “When faced with a problem, I usually see the one best solution very quickly,” “I don’t like situations that are uncertain,” and “It’s frustrating to listen to someone who cannot make up his or her mind.” Response options included strongly agree (coded 1), agree (coded 2), neither agree nor disagree (coded 3), disagree (coded 4), strongly disagree (coded 5). These three items were averaged to create an individual tolerance for ambiguity score for each respondent. These scores can range from 1 to 5 (M = 3.52, SD = .65) (N = 608). “Need for cognition” items included: “Thinking is not my idea of fun (reverse coded),” “I only think as hard as I have to (reverse coded),” and “I would prefer complex to simple problems.” Response options included strongly disagree (coded 1), disagree (coded 2), neither agree nor disagree (coded 3), agree (coded 4), strongly agree (coded 5). These three items were averaged to create an individual need for cognition score for each respondent. These scores can range from 1 to 5 (M = 3.76, SD = .72) (N = 608). In certain analyses, due to missing values and listwise deletion, the sample size drops to 601.

53. Again, the Hayes (2018) PROCESS macro was used. Hayes, Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis. The macro allows us to test whether the effects of an independent variable (the psychological trait tolerance for ambiguity) on a dependent variable (support for celebrity political expression) is accounted for by some other factor (political ideology). In each case, the confidence interval surrounding the coefficient did not include zero, indicating that at least part of the association between tolerance for ambiguity and support for celebrity expression was captured by political ideology.

54. Hartenstein, M. (2010). Jon Stewart’s Rally to Restore Sanity drew 200,000, beating estimated attendance at Glenn Beck’s. New York Daily News. October 31. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/jon-stewart-rally-restore-sanity-drew-200-000-beating-estimated-attendance-glenn-beck-article-1.188108.

55. Jon Stewart & Stephen Colbert Sanity/Fear Press Conference. (2011). National Press Club. June 24.

56. Hannity (2018). Fox News. May 17.

Chapter 9

1. Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1973). Uses and gratifications research. Public Opinion Quarterly, 37(4), 509–523.

2. Rubin, A. M., & Perse, E. M. (1987). Audience activity and television news gratifications. Communication Research, 14(1), 58–84. Feldman, L. (2013). Learning about politics from The Daily Show: The role of viewer orientation and processing motivations. Mass Communication and Society, 16(4), 586–607.

3. The 2010 Media Consumption Survey, sponsored by the Pew Research Center, obtained telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of 3,006 adults living in the continental United States. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International. The interviews were conducted in English by Princeton Data Source, June 8–28, 2010. Viewing estimates were obtained by asking respondents: “Now I’d like to ask you about some television and radio programs. How often do you … [Watch/listen to X], regularly, sometimes, hardly ever or never?” To capture viewer motivations, respondents were asked: “We’re interested in understanding WHY people use certain media sources. For example, earlier you said that you regularly turn to [program]. Do you turn to [program] MOSTLY … for the latest news and headlines, for in-depth reporting, for entertainment, or for interesting views and opinions?”

4. Lee, A. M. (2013). News audiences revisited: Theorizing the link between audience motivations and news consumption. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 57(3), 300–317.

5. The survey asked: “Most of us have different reasons and motivations for reading/watching/listening to the news. Thinking back to the sources you get your news from, please indicate the extent to which the following statements describe why you read/watch/listen to the news …” Information motivations included: “To find out what’s going on in the world; to keep up with the way your government performs; to make yourself an informed citizen; because it helps you learn about others; to gain important new information; and to fulfill your “need to know.” Social motivations included: “To keep up with what other people around you may be talking about; to appear informed to those around you; because most of your friends do; to make you more sociable; to have something to talk about with others; and to feel a part of a community.” Lee, News audiences revisited, 306.

6. Entertainment motivations include “because it’s exciting; for laughter; because it’s a habit that you have; and when there is nothing better to do.” Lee, News audiences revisited, 306.

7. Operationalized by Lee as “To help you form opinions on issues; to know about other people’s opinions; for views from like-minded commentators; and to expose yourself to views that are different from your own.” Lee, News audiences revisited, 306.

8. ANOVA exploring ideology as a function of “viewing for interesting views and opinions”: The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (F = 31.19, p < .001). The Colbert Report (F = 8.85, p < .01). Note that because only 10 respondents reported watching Colbert for in-depth reporting, the ideological leaning of this small sample is excluded from the figure.

9. ANOVA tests of “viewing for entertainment” versus viewing for other reasons: Glenn Beck (F = 19.63, p < .001), The O’Reilly Factor (F = 12.429, p < .001), Hannity (F = 5.21, p < .03), The Rush Limbaugh Show (F = 1.99, p = .16).

10. For example, ANOVA tests of ideology as a function of viewing for “in depth reporting”: Glenn Beck (F = 12.05, p< .001), The O’Reilly Factor (F = 12.74, p < .001).

11. “Daily Show” viewers knowledgeable about presidential campaign (2004). Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania. September 21. https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/daily-show-viewers-knowledgeable-about-presidential-campaign/.

12. A content analysis of 52 episodes of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart from 2005 shows that 46 percent of all stories and 25 percent of guest interviews covered world affairs in some way. See Brewer, P. R., & Marquardt, E. (2007). Mock news and democracy: Analyzing The Daily Show. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 15(4), 249–267.

13. What you know depends on what you watch. (2012). Fairleigh Dickinson University’s PublicMind Poll. May 3. http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/confirmed/.

14. Young, D. G., & Tisinger, R. M. (2006). Dispelling late-night myths: News consumption among late-night comedy viewers and the predictors of exposure to various late-night shows. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11(3), 113–134.

15. Since these studies are typically based on observational survey data, one can’t be 100 percent sure that the high rates of knowledge aren’t the result of some other trait tied up with satire viewing, but I am at least making a case that satire might help contribute to these audiences’ already high knowledge base.

16. While much of this research is based on observational survey data, experimental research confirms that satire is an effective educational tool, increasing audiences’ knowledge about current events. See Young, D. G., & Hoffman, L. (2012). Acquisition of current-events knowledge from political satire programming: An experimental approach. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 20(5), 290–304.

17. Lowrey, A. (2011). The economics of Occupy Wall Street. Slate. October 5. http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/10/occupy_wall_street_says_the_top_one_1_percent_of_americans_have_.html.

18. University of Delaware Newsroom (2012). Survey: Fox News viewers least informed, most negative about Occupy Wall Street. Press release. February 15. https://www.newswise.com/articles/survey-fox-news-viewers-least-informed-most-negative-about-occupy-wall-street.

19. Jones, J. P., Baym, G., & Day, A. (2012). Mr. Stewart and Mr. Colbert go to Washington: Television satirists outside the box. Social Research, 79, 50.

20. Hardy, B. W., Gottfried, J. A., Winneg, K. M., & Jamieson, K. H. (2014). Stephen Colbert’s civics lesson: How Colbert Super PAC taught viewers about campaign finance. Mass Communication and Society, 17(3), 329–353. Lamarre, H. (2013). Breaking boundaries: When parody and reality collide: Examining the effects of Colbert’s Super PAC satire on issue knowledge and policy engagement across media formats. International Journal of Communication, 7, 394–413.

21. Hardy et al., Stephen Colbert’s civics lesson.

22. Net neutrality. (2014). Last Week Tonight. June 1. HBO.

23. Becker, A. B., & Bode, L. (2018). Satire as a source for learning? The differential impact of news versus satire exposure on net neutrality knowledge gain. Information, Communication & Society, 21(4), 612–625.

24. Brewer, P. R., Young, D. G., Lambe, J. L., Hoffman, L. H., & Collier, J. (2018). “Seize your moment, my lovely trolls”: News, satire, and public opinion about net neutrality. International Journal of Communication, 12, 23.

25. Poll results. (2015). CNN. September 12. http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2015/images/09/12/iranpoll.pdf.

26. Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.

27. Mitchell, A., Gottfried, J., Barthel, M., & Sumida, N. (2018). Distinguishing between factual and opinion statements in the news. Pew Research Center. June 18. http://www.journalism.org/2018/06/18/distinguishing-between-factual-and-opinion-statements-in-the-news/.

28. Kull, S., Ramsay, C., & Lewis, E. (2003). Misperceptions, the media, and the Iraq war. Political Science Quarterly, 118(4), 569–598.

29. Gershkoff, A., & Kushner, S. (2005). Shaping public opinion: The 9/11-Iraq connection in the Bush administration’s rhetoric. Perspectives on Politics, 3(3), 525–537.

30. Sanburn, J. (2011). George W. Bush and the uranium. Time. January 25. http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2044176_2044193_2044206,00.html.

31. Rendell, S., & Broughel, T. (2003). Amplifying officials, squelching dissent. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting. May/June. www.fair.org/extra/0305/warstudy.html.

32. Muddiman, A., Stroud, N. J., & McCombs, M. (2014). Media fragmentation, attribute agenda setting, and political opinions about Iraq. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 58(2), 215–233.

33. Jamieson, K. H., & Cappella, J. N. (2008). Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment. New York: Oxford University Press.

34. Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber, 195.

35. Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber, 197.

36. Schroeder, E., & Stone, D. F. (2015). Fox News and political knowledge. Journal of Public Economics, 126, 52–63.

37. Schroeder & Stone, Fox News and political knowledge, 61.

38. See, for example, Hannity’s repeated unverified claims from 2017 indicating that DNC staffer Seth Rich was murdered by the Clinton organization.

39. Even after Fox News retracted the Seth Rich story and apologized, Hannity continued to cover the conspiracy theory, stating on his radio show: “I am not FoxNews.com,” and “I retract nothing”: DePaolo, J. (2017). Hannity says he feels “so badly” for Seth Rich’s family while ignoring family’s pleas to quit coverage. Mediaite. May 23. For a summary of the conspiracy theory see Guo, J. (2017). The bonkers Seth Rich conspiracy theory, explained. Vox. May 24. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/24/15685560/seth-rich-conspiracy-theory-explained-fox-news-hannity.

40. See, for example, Samantha Bee’s 2017 inaccurate claim that an attendee of the Conservative Political Action Conference had a “Nazi haircut” when it was later discovered that he actually had brain cancer. The host and her program immediately apologized, reedited the segment to delete the young man from the video, and pulled the footage from their website. Williams, D. (2017). Samantha Bee’s apology doesn’t impress cancer patient. CNN. March 10.

41. Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert Sanity/Fear Press Conference. (2010). National Press Club. October 30.

42. McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187.

43. Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (2010). News that matters: Television and American opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

44. Feldman, L., Maibach, E. W., Roser-Renouf, C., & Leiserowitz, A. (2011). Climate on cable: The nature and impact of global warming coverage on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC. International Journal of Press/Politics, 17(1), 3–31. Searles, K., & Smith, G. (2016). Who’s the boss? Setting the agenda in a fragmented media environment. International Journal of Communication, 10, 22.

45. Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche news: The politics of news choice. New York: Oxford University Press.

46. Searles & Smith, Who’s the boss?

47. Young, D. G. (2006). Late-night comedy and the salience of the candidates’ caricatured traits in the 2000 election. Mass Communication & Society, 9(3), 339–366.

48. McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1993). The evolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas. Journal of Communication, 43(2), 65.

49. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 52.

50. Haigh, M. M., & Heresco, A. (2010). Late-night Iraq: Monologue joke content and tone from 2003 to 2007. Mass Communication and Society, 13(2), 157–173.

51. Blake, M. (2014). John Oliver rails against cable companies over net neutrality. Los Angeles Times. June 2. http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/showtracker/la-et-st-john-oliver-rails-against-cable-companies-over-net-neutrality-20140602-story.html.

52. 2014 survey N = 812; 2015 survey N = 744.

53. Gandy, O. H., Jr. (1980). Information in health: Subsidised news. Media, Culture & Society, 2(2), 103–115, 104.

54. Brewer, P. R., Young, D. G., & Morreale, M. (2013). The impact of real news about “fake news”: Intertextual processes and political satire. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 25(3), 323–343.

55. Young, D. G. (2004). Late-night comedy in election 2000: Its influence on candidate trait ratings and the moderating effects of political knowledge and partisanship. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 48(1), 1–22.

56. Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J. S. (2006). The Daily Show effect: Candidate evaluations, efficacy, and American youth. American Politics Research, 34(3), 341–367.

57. Morris, J. S. (2009). The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and audience attitude change during the 2004 party conventions. Political Behavior, 31(1), 79–102.

58. Feldman et al., Climate on cable.

59. Feldman et al., Climate on cable.

60. Muddiman, A., Stroud, N. J., & McCombs, M. (2014). Media fragmentation, attribute agenda setting, and political opinions about Iraq. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 58(2), 215–233.

61. Muddiman, Stroud, & McCombs, Media fragmentation, attribute agenda setting, and political opinions about Iraq, 224.

62. Brewer et al., “Seize your moment, my lovely trolls,” 23.

63. Brewer, P. R., Lambe, J. L., & Jones, P. E. (2017). The foundations of US public opinion about campaign finance in the post–Citizens United era. Election Law Journal, 16(1), 183–195, 191.

64. Hollander, B. A. (1996). Talk radio: Predictors of use and effects on attitudes about government. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 73(1), 102–113. Hollander, B. (1996). The influence of talk radio on political efficacy and participation. Journal of Radio Studies, 23(3). Jamieson & Cappella, Echo chamber.

65. Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. American Journal of Political Science, 49, 388–405. Brader, T. (2006). Campaigning for hearts and minds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

66. Brooks, D. J., & Geer, J. (2007). Beyond negativity: The effects of incivility on the electorate. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 1–16.

67. Martin, P. S. (2004). Inside the black box of negative campaign effects: Three reasons why negative campaigns mobilize. Political Psychology, 25(4), 545–562.

68. Ellul, J. (1973). Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. New York: Vintage Books.

69. Ellul, Propaganda, 73.

70. Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K., & Hutchings, V. L. (2011). Election night’s alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation. Journal of Politics, 73(1), 156–170.

71. Valentino et al., Election night’s alright for fighting, 159.

72. Ost, D. (2004). Politics as the mobilization of anger: Emotions in movements and in power. European Journal of Social Theory, 7(2), 229–244.

73. Ost, D. (2004). Politics as the mobilization of anger, 238.

74. Wagner, J. (2018). Trump uses Twitter to promote video of supporters chanting “CNN sucks.” Washington Post. August 1. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-uses-twitter-to-promote-video-of-supporters-chanting-cnn-sucks/2018/08/01/1bf288d4-9574-11e8-810c-5fa705927d54_story.html?utm:term=.4a146f367842.

75. Cao, X., & Brewer, P. R. (2008). Political comedy shows and public participation in politics. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20(1), 90–99.

76. Baumgartner, J. C., & Lockerbie, B. (2018). Maybe it is more than a joke: Satire, mobilization, and political participation. Social Science Quarterly, 99(3), 1060–1074.

77. Lee, H. (2012). Communication mediation model of late-night comedy: The mediating role of structural features of interpersonal talk between comedy viewing and political participation. Mass Communication and Society, 15(5), 647–671.

78. Hoffman, L. H., & Young, D. G. (2011). Satire, punch lines, and the nightly news: Untangling media effects on political participation. Communication Research Reports, 28(2), 159–168.

79. Baumgartner & Morris, The Daily Show effect. Brewer, Young, & Morreale, The impact of real news about “fake news.”

80. Bennett, S. E. (1997). Knowledge of politics and sense of subjective political competence: The ambiguous connection. American Politics Research, 25, 230–240. doi: 10.1177/1532673X9702500205. Kenski, K., & Stroud, N. J. (2006). Connections between internet use and political efficacy, knowledge, and participation. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 50(2), 173–192. doi: 10.1207/s15506878jobem5002_1.

81. Young, D. G., & Esralew, S. (2011). Jon Stewart a heretic? Surely you jest: Political participation and discussion among viewers of late-night comedy programming. In A. Amarasinga (ed.), The Stewart/Colbert effect: Essays on the real impact of fake news, 99–116. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. .

82. Young, D. G., & Tisinger, R. (2006). Dispelling late-night myths: News consumption among late-night comedy viewers and the predictors of exposure to various late-night shows. International Journal of Press/Politics, 11, 113–134. Xenos, M. A., & Becker, A. B. (2009). Moments of Zen: Effects of The Daily Show on information seeking and political learning. Political Communication, 26(3), 317–332.

83. Feldman, L., & Young, D. G. (2008). Late-night comedy as a gateway to traditional news: An analysis of time trends in news attention among late-night comedy viewers during the 2004 presidential primaries. Political Communication, 25(4), 401–422.

84. Baum, M. A. (2003). Soft news and political knowledge: Evidence of absence or absence of evidence? Political Communication, 20, 173–190. Baum, M. A. (2003). Soft news goes to war. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

85. Gamson, W. (1968). Power and discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey. See also Hollander, B. A. (1997). Fuel to the fire: Talk radio and the Gamson hypothesis. Political Communication, 14(3), 355–369.

86. Johnson, T. J., & Kaye, B. K. (2013). Putting out fire with gasoline: Testing the Gamson hypothesis on media reliance and political activity. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 57(4), 457. Gamson, Power and discontent.

87. Hollander, B. A. (1996). Talk radio: Predictors of use and effects on attitudes about government. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 73(1), 102–113.

88. Measured with “When something is run by government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful.”

89. Hollander, Talk radio.

90. Baumgartner & Morris, The Daily Show effect, 34.

91. Hart, R. P., & Hartelius, E. J. (2007). The political sins of Jon Stewart. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 24(3), 263–272.

92. Hart & Hartelius, The political sins of Jon Stewart, 270.

93. Hart & Hartelius, The political sins of Jon Stewart, 270, 267.

94. See Young, D. G. (2013). Lighten up: How satire will make American politics relevant again. Columbia Journalism Review (July/August): 26–28. https://archives.cjr.org/cover_story/lighten_up.php.

95. Cao & Brewer, Political comedy shows and public participation in politics; Baumgartner & Lockerbie, Maybe it is more than a joke. Lee, Communication mediation model of late-night comedy.

96. Baumgartner & Morris, The Daily Show effect. Becker, A. B. (2011). Political humor as democratic relief? The effects of exposure to comedy and straight news on trust and efficacy. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 19(5), 235–250.

97. Baumgartner & Morris, The Daily Show effect.

98. Heimlich, R. (2011). Hannity fans see bias in news. Pew Research Center. January 14.

99. Shaer, M. (2017). How far will Sean Hannity go? New York Times Magazine. November 28.

100. Grynbaum, M. (2017). Trump calls the news media the “enemy of the American people.” New York Times. February 17. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/trump-calls-the-news-media-the-enemy-of-the-people.html.

101. Ladd, J. M. (2010). The neglected power of elite opinion leadership to produce antipathy toward the news media: Evidence from a survey experiment. Political Behavior, 32(1), 29–50.

102. Holbert, R. L., Lambe, J., Dudo, A. D., & Carlton, K. A. (2007). Primacy effects of The Daily Show and national TV news viewing: Young viewers, political gratifications, and internal political self-efficacy. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 51, 20–38. doi: 10.1080/08838150701308002; Littau, J., & Stewart, D. R. (2015). “Truthiness” and second-level agenda setting: Satire news and its influence on perceptions of television news credibility. Electronic News, 9, 122–136. doi: 10.1177/1931243115581416; Morris, J. S., & Baumgartner, J. C. (2008). The Daily Show and attitudes toward the news media. In J. C. Baumgartner & J. S. Morris (eds.), Laughing matters: Humor and American politics in the Media Age, 315–331. New York: Routledge.

103. Morris & Baumgartner, The Daily Show and attitudes toward the news media.

104. Peifer, J. T. (2017). Imitation as flattery: How TV news parody’s media criticism can influence perceived news media importance and media trust. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. doi:1077699017713002. Peifer, J. T. (2018). Liking the (funny) messenger: The influence of news parody exposure, mirth, and predispositions on media trust. Media Psychology, 1–29.

105. Peifer, Imitation as flattery, 738.

106. Peifer, Imitation as flattery, 739.

107. Peifer, Imitation as flattery, 739.

Chapter 10

1. Pressman, M. (2009). What ever happened to Air America? Vanity Fair. March. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2009/03/what-ever-happened-to-air-america.

2. Lank, B. (2018). Interview with author. May 23.

3. A change in the editorial direction of the network came in 2007, closing the news division altogether and leaning instead in the direction of comedy-tinged outrage.

4. Left of the dial. 2005. HBO. Produced by P. Farrell and K. O’Callaghan.

5. Left of the dial.

6. Berry, J. M., & Sobieraj, S. (2014). The outrage industry: Political opinion media and the new incivility. New York: Oxford University Press.

7. Lank, B. (2018). Interview with author. May 23.

8. Corliss, R. (2010). Why Air America will be missed. Time. January 21. http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1955848,00.html. Lank, B. (2018). Interview with author. May 23.

9. Q and A with Randi Rhodes (2005). C-Span. December 13. https://www.c-span.org/video/?190377-1/qa-randi-rhodes.

10. Lank, B. (2018). Interview with author. May 23.

11. Corliss, Why Air America will be missed. Lank, B. (2018). Interview with author. May 23.

12. Air America host Randi Rhodes suspended for calling Hillary a “big f*cking whore.” (2008). Huffington Post. April 11. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/03/air-america-host-randi-rh_n_94863.html.

13. Glaister, D. (2007). Fox launches rightwing satire show. Guardian. February 16. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/feb/16/usnews.broadcasting.

14. Poniewozik, J. (2007). All-time 100 TV shows. Time. September 6. Stanley, Alessandra (2003). Television review; Countering terrorists, and a dense daughter. New York Times. October 28.

15. Stelter, B. (2013). Revival of “24” is more like “12.” New York Times. May 13. https://www.nytim9es.com/2013/05/14/business/media/fox-to-bring-back-24-and-jack-bauer.html.

16. Green, A. (2005). Normalizing torture on “24.” New York Times. May 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/22/arts/television/normalizing-torture-on-24.html.

17. Hewitt, H. (2007). “24” creator Joel Surnow on his new creation, the ½ Hour News Hour, and reacting to the hit piece in the New Yorker. HughHewitt.com. February 16. http://www.hughhewitt.com/24-creator-joel-surnow-on-his-new-creation-the-12-hour-news-hour-and-reacting-to-the-hit-piece-in-the-new-yorker/.

18. Hewitt, “24” creator Joel Surnow on his new creation.

19. Morrison, O. (2015). Waiting for the conservative Jon Stewart. Atlantic. February 14. https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/02/why-theres-no-conservative-jon-stewart/385480/.

20. Schimkowitz, M. (2013). “The ½ Hour News Hour”: How Fox News’s “Daily Show” did to comedy what Fox News does to news. Splitsider. September 23. http://www.vulture.com/2013/09/the-12-hour-news-hour-how-fox-newss-daily-show-did-to-comedy-what-fox-news-did-to-news.html.

21. Khanna, S. (2007). Fox’s right-wing alternative to Daily Show fails. Think Progress. August 14. https://thinkprogress.org/foxs-right-wing-alternative-to-daily-show-fails-c468d7278fe7/.

22. Garron, B. (2007). The ½ Hour News Hour. Hollywood Reporter. February 15. https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/12-hour-news-hour-159093.

23. Griffin, J. (2017). The conservative “Daily Show”: Fox News’ failed foray into satire and why it matters. Pop Matters. November 6. https://www.popmatters.com/1-2-hour-news-hour-joel-surnow-fox-news-failed-foray-into-satire-2500322998.html.

24. Similar to when Trump revised the comedians’ jokes at his Friar’s Club roast. Remember how he removed the incongruity by deleting the punchlines?

25. Smith, C. (2016). The Daily Show (the book): An oral history as told by Jon Stewart, the correspondents, staff and guests. New York: Grand Central Publishing, 76.

26. Campbell, K. (2016). Jimmy Fallon speaks out about Orlando shooting in his opening monologue. Us. June 14. https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/jimmy-fallon-talks-about-orlando-shooting-in-opening-monologue-w209991/.

27. Caron, C. (2017). Heather Heyer, Charlottesville victim, is recalled as “a strong woman.” New York Times. August 13. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/heather-heyer-charlottesville-victim.html?_r=0.

28. Jensen, E. (2017). An emotional Jimmy Fallon and an angry Seth Meyers address Charlottesville events. USA Today. August 15. https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/entertainthis/2017/08/15/jimmy-fallon-on-charlottesville-we-must-stand-against-what-wrong/567756001/.

29. Dessem, M. (2017). A teary-eyed Jimmy Kimmel talks about his infant son’s heart disease, blasts Trumpcare. Slate. May 2. http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2017/05/02/a_teary_eyed_jimmy_kimmel_talks_about_his_infant_son_s_heart_disease.html.

30. Rao, S. (2018). “There’s reason for hope”: Stephen Colbert praises Parkland students’ campaign for gun reform. Washington Post. February 21. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2018/02/21/theres-reason-for-hope-stephen-colbert-praises-parkland-students-campaign-for-gun-reform/?utm:term=.4ecdc344976c.

31. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry.

32. Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Vintage Books.

33. Berry & Sobieraj, The outrage industry, 146.

34. Smith, K. B., Oxley, D. R., Hibbing, M. V., Alford, J. R., & Hibbing, J. R. (2011). Linking genetics and political attitudes: Reconceptualizing political ideology. Political Psychology, 32(3), 369.

35. Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., Scalora, M., Hatemi, P., & Hibbing, J. R. (2008). Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. Science, 321(5896), 1667–1670.

36. Personal correspondence with author, December 14, 2018.

37. Fox, J. D. (2017). Trump is one of the worst things ever to happen to comedy. Vulture. December 21. http://www.vulture.com/2017/12/donald-trump-jokes-bad-comedy.html.

38. Schaefer, S. (2017). Why Trump jokes aren’t funny. Scotland Herald. July 29. http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/15442379.Why_Trump_jokes_aren_t_funny__American_stand_up_Sara_Schaefer_on_making_comedy_in_the_age_of_the_45th_US_president/.

39. Schaefer, Why Trump jokes aren’t funny.

40. Kaling, M. (2017). Tweet from @mindykaling. October 2.

41. Wright, M. (2018). Samantha Bee to Ivanka Trump: “Do something about your dad’s immigration practices, you feckless c*nt!” Vulture. May 31. http://www.vulture.com/2018/05/samantha-bee-calls-out-feckless-c-nt-ivanka-trump.html.

42. War of words: Why Samantha Bee survived controversy and Roseanne didn’t. (2018). NBC Nightly News with Lester Holt. June 1. https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/war-of-words-why-samantha-bee-survived-controversy-and-roseanne-didn-t-1246641219530.

43. Mazza, E. (2018). Trevor Noah reveals the real reason Jon Stewart left “The Daily Show.” Huffington Post. June 12. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trevor-noah-jon-stewart-daily-show_us_5b1f3b35e4b0adfb826ced27.

44. Stambler, L. (2010). Dick and Tom Smothers: Hall of Fame tribute. Emmys.com. N.d. https://www.emmys.com/news/hall-fame/dick-smothers-tom-smothers-hall-fame-tribute.

45. Rubin, J. (2018). Journalists are at risk around the globe. Trump keeps adding fuel to the fire. Washington Post. July 30. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/07/30/journalists-are-at-risk-around-the-globe-trump-keeps-adding-fuel-to-the-fire/?utm:term=.c1d308efd028.

46. Sykes, C. (2017). A guide for frustrated conservatives in the age of Trump. NBCnews.com. October 23. https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/guide-frustrated-conservatives-age-trump-ncna813226.

47. See the introduction.

48. Romano, N. (2017). Stephen Colbert Late Show monologue called “homophobic,” incites #firecolbert campaign. Entertainment Weekly. May 3. 03/stephen-colbert-late-show-monologue-firecwolbert/.

49. Bradley, L. (2018). Colbert tears into Jeff Sessions for “evil” immigrant-children policy. Vanity Fair. June 15. https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/06/colbert-immigrant-children-policy-sessions-bible-late-show.

50. Bradley, L. (2018). John Oliver rips into Trump’s “objectively awful” immigrant children policy. Vanity Fair. June 18. https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/06/immigrant-children-camps-detention-centers-border-separation-john-oliver.

51. Parker, N. (2018). Michelle Wolf went full meta on “The Break” and it was the best comedy moment all week. Salon.com. July 19. https://www.salon.com/2018/07/19/michelle-wolf-went-full-meta-on-the-break-and-it-was-the-best-comedy-moment-all-week/.

Chapter 11

1. Jamieson, K. H. (2018). Cyberwar: How Russian hackers and trolls helped elect a president: What we don’t, can’t, and do know. New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Ellul, J. (1973). Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. New York: Vintage Books.

3. Ellul, Propaganda, 72.

4. Ellul, Propaganda, 63.

5. Colbert: “Re-becoming” the nation we always were. (2012). Fresh Air. NPR. October 4. https://www.npr.org/2012/10/04/162304439/colbert-re-becoming-the-nation-we-always-were.

6. Colbert: “Re-becoming” the nation we always were.

7. John Oliver is no one’s friend on his new HBO show. (2014). Fresh Air. NPR. June 19.

8. Jon Stewart & Stephen Colbert Sanity/Fear Press Conference. (2011). National Press Club. June 24.

9. Jensen, E. (2018). Michelle Wolf’s White House correspondents’ dinner remarks condemned by WHCA president. USA Today. April 30. https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/04/30/michelle-wolf-white-house-correspondents-dinner-whca-president-margaret-talev/563835002/.

10. Lesser, F. (2017). “Trump claims no one cares about his taxes. The next mass protest should be on Tax Day to prove him wrong.” Twitter. January 22, 2:37 p.m. https://twitter.com/sadmonsters/status/823298584409997312.

11. Lesser, F. (2017). Interview with author. October 31.

12. Lesser, F. (2017). Interview with author. October 31.

13. Curl, J. (2018). At star-studded rally, Trump makes closing argument: “Stop radical resistance in its tracks.” Daily Wire. November 6. https://www.dailywire.com/news/38011/trumps-star-studded-closing-argument-stop-radical-joseph-curl.

14. Wemple, E. (2018). Fox News’s Sean Hannity: Proud to be a Trump operative. Washington Post. November 6. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2018/11/06/fox-newss-sean-hannity-proud-to-be-a-trump-operative/?utm:term=.64f39932e7bc.

15. Pirro on “Russian collusion delusion”: “Time for the Left to fold up their fantasy tents.” (2018). Fox News. December 9.http://insider.foxnews.com/2018/12/09/judge-jeanine-pirro-rips-james-comey-and-russian-collusion-delusion-against-trump.

16. Curl, At star-studded rally, Trump makes closing argument.